To incentivize the fast server or not? Firm's dilemma when queue signals service rate in high-contact services
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Publication:2060338
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2021.06.018OpenAlexW3179677725MaRDI QIDQ2060338
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.06.018
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Cites Work
- To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
- Equilibrium in a finite capacity \(M/M/1\) queue with unknown service rates consisting of strategic and non-strategic customers
- Strategic behavior in queues with the effect of the number of customers behind
- Modeling and Worker Motivation in JIT Production Systems
- Quality–Speed Conundrum: Trade-offs in Customer-Intensive Services
- Rational Queueing
- Staffing, Routing, and Payment to Trade off Speed and Quality in Large Service Systems
- Equilibrium in Queues Under Unknown Service Times and Service Value
- The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
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