To incentivize the fast server or not? Firm's dilemma when queue signals service rate in high-contact services

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2021.06.018OpenAlexW3179677725MaRDI QIDQ2060338

S. Srivatsa Srinivas

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.06.018

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumholeincentiveunknown service ratesqueueing game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Related Items (1)

Equilibrium queueing strategies in M/G/1 queues with the reference time effect

Cites Work

• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• Equilibrium in a finite capacity \(M/M/1\) queue with unknown service rates consisting of strategic and non-strategic customers
• Strategic behavior in queues with the effect of the number of customers behind
• Modeling and Worker Motivation in JIT Production Systems
• Quality–Speed Conundrum: Trade-offs in Customer-Intensive Services
• Rational Queueing
• Staffing, Routing, and Payment to Trade off Speed and Quality in Large Service Systems
• Equilibrium in Queues Under Unknown Service Times and Service Value
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls

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