The secretary problem with multiple job vacancies and batch candidate arrivals

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2021.05.014OpenAlexW3168692769MaRDI QIDQ2060597

Peiwen Yu, Qing Li

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.05.014

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic programmingstructural propertiesrecruitmentdynamic auctionsmultimodularitysequential investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

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• The Dynamic and Stochastic Knapsack Problem with Random Sized Items
• The Secretary Problem and Its Extensions: A Review
• The Dynamic and Stochastic Knapsack Problem with Deadlines
• Technical Note—A Note on the Structure of Joint Inventory-Pricing Control with Leadtimes
• Optimal Sequential Investment Decisions Under Conditions of Uncertainty

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