Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2021.103577zbMath1481.91127arXiv1502.07823OpenAlexW3193966551MaRDI QIDQ2060701

Yuan Deng, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1502.07823

zbMATH Keywords

Gale-Shapley algorithmcoalition manipulationpermutation manipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams

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