Strategyproof mechanisms for friends and enemies games

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2021.103610zbMath1481.91014OpenAlexW3208235834MaRDI QIDQ2060745

Bojana Kodric, Giovanna Varricchio, Michele Flammini

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103610

zbMATH Keywords

hedonic gamesstrategyproof mechanismsfriends and enemies games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proof coalition formation
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
• On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Nash Stable Outcomes in Fractional Hedonic Games: Existence, Efficiency and Computation
• Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games
• Computing Stable Outcomes in Symmetric Additively Separable Hedonic Games
• Hedonic Games
• Algorithmic Game Theory

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