Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?
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Publication:2061097
DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01235-2zbMath1479.91302OpenAlexW2587544920MaRDI QIDQ2061097
Torben M. Andersen, Joydeep Bhattacharya
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=econ_workingpapers
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Cites Work
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- Temptation and Self-Control
- Pensions, household saving, and welfare: A dynamic analysis of crowd out
- A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus Payments
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