Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism

DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01236-1zbMath1479.91298OpenAlexW2991665043MaRDI QIDQ2061099

Stephan Imhof, Oriol Tejada, Hans Gersbach

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01236-1

zbMATH Keywords

transfersmajority rulelegislative bargainingincomplete social contractspublic project provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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• An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
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• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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