Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction

DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01240-5zbMath1479.91154OpenAlexW2992173276WikidataQ126620126 ScholiaQ126620126MaRDI QIDQ2061103

Thomas W. L. Norman

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01240-5

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategyspitelocally envy-free equilibriumsymmetric Nash equilibriumonline advertisingposition auctionsInternet auctionsVickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (2)

Effects of competition in first-price auctions ⋮ Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation

Cites Work

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