Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
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Publication:2061119
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01255-3zbMath1479.91240OpenAlexW3125690613MaRDI QIDQ2061119
Qianfeng Tang, Yong-Chao Zhang
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01255-3
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