The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
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Publication:2061122
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01259-zzbMath1477.91005OpenAlexW3014380219MaRDI QIDQ2061122
Xuewen Qian, Xiao Luo, Yang Sun
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/60452/1/ECTH-D-19-00288_R2%20%285%29.pdf
2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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