A brief history of social choice and welfare theory

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_1zbMath1480.91096OpenAlexW3145861712MaRDI QIDQ2064124

Maurice Salles, Fleurbaey, Marc

Publication date: 5 January 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History of game theory, economics, and finance (91-03) Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Geometry of voting
• Philosophical and mathematical logic
• Introduction to formal philosophy. With the assistance of Esther Michelsen Kjeldahl
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Arrow's decisive coalitions
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
• Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
• Stability in Voting
• The Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item