Gabrielle Demange
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Publication:2064131
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_8zbMath1482.01031OpenAlexW4246250028MaRDI QIDQ2064131
Publication date: 5 January 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_8
Cites Work
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Sustainable oligopolies
- Can everyone benefit from growth ? Two difficulties
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
- A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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