John A. Weymark
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2064140
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_16zbMath1482.01015OpenAlexW3142304561MaRDI QIDQ2064140
Claude d'Aspremont, Felix J. Bierbrauer
Publication date: 5 January 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_16
Biographies, obituaries, personalia, bibliographies (01A70) Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint
- Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules
- Pexider's equation and aggregation of allocations
- On the optimality of optimal income taxation
- Implementation of first-best allocations via generalized tax schedules
- Measurement scales and welfarist social choice
- Ordered sum and tensor product of linear utility structures
- Optimal nonlinear income tax and nonlinear pricing: Optimality conditions and comparative static properties
- Bunching and second-order conditions: A note on optimal tax theory
- Bunching properties of optimal nonlinear income taxes
- Arrow's theorem with a fixed feasible alternative
- Social choice in economic environments
- Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
- A single-parameter generalization of the Gini indices of inequality
- Taxing price makers
- Generalized Gini inequality indices
- A cause of preference is not an object of preference
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics
- On Pareto-improving price changes
- Measures of relative equality and their meaning in terms of social welfare
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem for state-contingent alternatives
- Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
- Life-history evolution and the origin of multicellularity
- Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
- Measurement theory and the foundations of utilitarianism
- Some formal models of grading principles
- Multidimensional generalized Gini indices
- Inclusive fitness maximization: an axiomatic approach
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Polychromatic Acyclic Tours in Colored Multigraphs
- Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction
- Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
- Private Constant Returns and Public Shadow Prices
- Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
- Surplus-Sharing Local Games in Dynamic Exchange Processes
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities
- Harsanyi’s ‘Utilitarian Theorem’ and Utilitarianism
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility
This page was built for publication: John A. Weymark
