Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2021.11.011zbMath1480.91018OpenAlexW3013124192MaRDI QIDQ2065768

Publication date: 13 January 2022

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101464/1/MPRA_paper_101464.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

polynomial-time algorithm cooperative game level structure Harsanyi dividends (nested) Shapley/Owen (levels) value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

Cites Work

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