Taxation and the sustainability of collusion with asymmetric costs

DOI10.1007/S00712-021-00751-XzbMath1480.91147OpenAlexW3183792067MaRDI QIDQ2066669

Douglas C. Turner

Publication date: 14 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00751-x

zbMATH Keywords

collusiontaxationcartel stabilityfirm asymmetry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes
• Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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