Technology licensing under product differentiation
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Publication:2066676
DOI10.1007/s00712-021-00750-yzbMath1480.91118OpenAlexW3183195852MaRDI QIDQ2066676
Neelanjan Sen, Rajit Biswas, Saumya Kaul
Publication date: 14 January 2022
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00750-y
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (3)
Merger under horizontal and vertical product differentiation ⋮ More licensed technologies may make it worse: a welfare analysis of licensing vertically two-tier foreign technologies ⋮ When to merge with a lower quality producer?
Cites Work
- Licensing of a quality-improving innovation
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- Cartel stability in advertising-intensive and R\&D-intensive industries
- A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- Welfare reducing licensing.
- The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
- Intra-brand competition in a differentiated oligopoly
- Revenue royalties: comment
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
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