Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions

DOI10.1007/s00712-021-00746-8zbMath1480.91114OpenAlexW3171943870MaRDI QIDQ2066677

Shuang Xu, Yong Zhao, Yeming Gong

Publication date: 14 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00746-8

zbMATH Keywords

sequential auctionsinformation disclosuremulti-unit demandexpected revenuesingle-unit demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
• Private monitoring in auctions
• Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement
• He who must not be named
• Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers
• The declining price anomaly
• Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

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