Designing communication hierarchies
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Publication:2067355
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105349zbMath1481.91108OpenAlexW3197291352MaRDI QIDQ2067355
Publication date: 18 January 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105349
Cites Work
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