Designing communication hierarchies

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105349zbMath1481.91108OpenAlexW3197291352MaRDI QIDQ2067355

Dimitri Migrow

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105349

zbMATH Keywords

information aggregationstrategic communicationorganizational design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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