When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105354zbMath1481.91072OpenAlexW3200501838MaRDI QIDQ2067358

Rune Midjord, Justin Valasek, Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105354

zbMATH Keywords

votinginformation aggregationCondorcet jury theoremexpressive payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
• Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
• Majority rule when voters like to win
• Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections
• Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete Information
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation
• On the Distribution of the Number of Successes in Independent Trials
• Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting

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