Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105355zbMath1481.91050OpenAlexW3199576713MaRDI QIDQ2067359

Giacomo Valletta, Efthymios Athanasiou

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105355

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessbinary public decisionsbudget-balancedecision efficiencyundominated mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
• Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
• The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
• Incentives in Teams
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Undominated Groves Mechanisms

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