Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105370zbMath1481.91121arXiv2101.06885OpenAlexW3209254614MaRDI QIDQ2067372

Georgy Artemov

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.06885

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitiondeferred acceptanceschool choiceimmediate acceptance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets ⋮ School choice with costly information acquisition

Cites Work

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