In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105371zbMath1481.91089OpenAlexW3206109040WikidataQ114160482 ScholiaQ114160482MaRDI QIDQ2067373

Domenico Menicucci

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105371

zbMATH Keywords

virtual valuationreserve pricesecond price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Competing auctions with non-identical objects

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design

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