Cultural transmission with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105373zbMath1481.91153OpenAlexW3208684608MaRDI QIDQ2067376

Fabrizio Panebianco, Sebastiano Della Lena

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105373

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationcultural transmissioncultural leadersgroup size misperceptionparental efficacy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Social learning (91D15)

Related Items (2)

Marital preferences and stable matching in cultural evolution ⋮ On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust

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