Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105088zbMath1481.91045arXiv1811.01320OpenAlexW3039850066MaRDI QIDQ2067386

Luca Rigotti, Giuseppe Lopomo, Chris Shannon

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.01320

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessambiguitymechanism designKnightian uncertaintysurplus extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
• The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Locally robust implementation and its limits
• Utility representation of an incomplete preference relation
• A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
• On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• Continuity in auction design
• Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom.
• Knightian decision theory. I.
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude
• Multiperson utility
• Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
• Representation of subjective preferences under ambiguity
• Surplus Extraction and Competition
• Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction
• The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Prevalence: a translation-invariant “almost every” on infinite-dimensional spaces
• Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism
• Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom: A Correction
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Uncertainty and Risk in Financial Markets
• A Subjective Spin on Roulette Wheels
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom

This page was built for publication: Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction