Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds
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Publication:2067389
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105166zbMath1481.91156OpenAlexW3110325194MaRDI QIDQ2067389
Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler, Itzhak Gilboa
Publication date: 18 January 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105166
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