Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105188zbMath1481.91155OpenAlexW2811305948MaRDI QIDQ2067391

Roberta De Filippis, Antonio Guarino, Toru Kitagawa, Philippe Jehiel

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10067007/

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsocial learningmultiple priorsambiguous belief updating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Social learning (91D15)

Related Items

Distrust in experts and the origins of disagreement ⋮ Relative maximum likelihood updating of ambiguous beliefs ⋮ Doob's consistency of a non-Bayesian updating process ⋮ Ambiguous information and dilation: an experiment ⋮ Information choice in a social learning experiment

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• Self-Correcting Information Cascades