Updating confidence in beliefs

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105209zbMath1481.91061OpenAlexW3127436034MaRDI QIDQ2067404

Brian Hill

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105209

zbMATH Keywords

confidenceambiguitymultiple priorsbelief updatecomplete ignoranceupdate on surprising or null events

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Relative maximum likelihood updating of ambiguous beliefs

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