Optimal pricing policy design for selling cost-reducing innovation in Cournot games

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2021.12.001OpenAlexW4200338178MaRDI QIDQ2067618

Pingzhong Tang, Haoqiang Huang, Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Mengjing Chen, Jie Zhang

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2021.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumpatent licensingdominant strategyCournot marketsoptimal pricing policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Licensing under general demand and cost functions
• An extension of Karmarkar's projective algorithm for convex quadratic programming
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: general results
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Fee versus royalty reconsidered
• The knapsack problem with a minimum filling constraint
• A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium
• Contracting with Externalities

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