Are actions costlier than words? Formal models of protester-police dynamic interactions and evidence from empirical analysis

DOI10.1007/S43069-021-00099-4zbMath1478.91026OpenAlexW3209123999MaRDI QIDQ2068833

Sargis Karavardanyan

Publication date: 20 January 2022

Published in: SN Operations Research Forum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s43069-021-00099-4

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamescooperationrisk and uncertaintycollective decision makingauthoritarianismprotest and repression

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Uses Software

• SPSS
• SAS

Cites Work

• Modeling binary correlated responses using SAS, SPSS and R
• Coercion and revolution: Variations on a Predator-Prey model
• The econometrics of panel data. Fundamental and recent developments in theory and practice.
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks

This page was built for publication: Are actions costlier than words? Formal models of protester-police dynamic interactions and evidence from empirical analysis