Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01339-6zbMath1481.91070OpenAlexW3159606244MaRDI QIDQ2068879

Giuseppe Vittucci Marzetti, Stefano Benati

Publication date: 20 January 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01339-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players
• Spatial power indices with applications on real voting data from the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech parliament
• Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
• The complexity of computing the permanent
• Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure
• Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU
• The complexity of power indexes with graph restricted coalitions
• NP-completeness of some problems concerning voting games
• Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling
• Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
• Who has the power in the EU?
• Random generation of combinatorial structures from a uniform distribution
• Generating functions for computing the Myerson value
• Improving polynomial estimation of the Shapley value by stratified random sampling with optimum allocation
• The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
• The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.
• A stochastic approach to approximate values in cooperative games
• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• Evaluation of Banzhaf index with restrictions on coalitions formation
• An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index
• The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
• Spectrum value for coalitional games
• Probabilistic spatial power indexes
• Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Efficient Computation of Power Indices for Weighted Majority Games
• The Banzhaf value and communication situations
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently
• NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games

This page was built for publication: Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union