Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01312-3zbMath1481.91126OpenAlexW3162916646MaRDI QIDQ2068882

Flip Klijn, Markus Walzl, Christopher Kah

Publication date: 20 January 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01312-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Preference aggregation for couples

Cites Work

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• Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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