Information disclosure with many alternatives

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01341-yzbMath1481.91052OpenAlexW3169029167MaRDI QIDQ2068884

Antonio Nicolò, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 20 January 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01341-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Social choice and strategic decisions. Essay in honor of Jeffrey S. Banks.
• Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
• Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Voting by Committees
• Competition in Persuasion

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