Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110164zbMath1480.91095OpenAlexW3215417108MaRDI QIDQ2069957

Sarvesh Bandhu, Anup Pramanik, Bishwajyoti Mondal

Publication date: 21 January 2022

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110164

zbMATH Keywords

votingstrategy-proofnessconflicting preference domainsunanimity with status-quo rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population

Cites Work

• Strategy-proof location on a network
• Circular domains
• A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
• Further results on dictatorial domains
• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
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• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
• Dictatorial domains
• Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
• Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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