Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2070283
DOI10.1007/s11538-021-00980-7zbMath1481.91026OpenAlexW4200458447WikidataQ113900089 ScholiaQ113900089MaRDI QIDQ2070283
Publication date: 24 January 2022
Published in: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-021-00980-7
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- A generalization of Hamilton's rule -- love others how much?
- Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
- Evolutionary substitution and replacement in \(N\)-species Lotka-Volterra systems
- In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The role of mixed strategies in spatial evolutionary games
- A two-player iterated survival game
- Evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- Active linking in evolutionary games
- Survivor's dilemma: defend the group or flee?
- A temporal model of territorial defence with antagonistic interactions
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.
- Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
- Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
This page was built for publication: Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user
