Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
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Publication:2070570
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.09.001zbMath1482.91010OpenAlexW3201607707MaRDI QIDQ2070570
Aymeric Lardon, Stéphane Gonzalez
Publication date: 24 January 2022
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.09.001
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Cites Work
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