Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.08.003zbMath1491.91009OpenAlexW3014568426MaRDI QIDQ2070579

Ismail Saglam, Ayça Özdoğan

Publication date: 24 January 2022

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumdisobedience cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

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• Perfect correlated equilibria
• Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games
• Improving Nash by coarse correlation
• Recommended play and correlated equilibria: an experimental study
• On the Value of Correlation
• Existence of Correlated Equilibria
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games

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