Two-agent interactive implementation

DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00247-6zbMath1480.91098OpenAlexW3134222840MaRDI QIDQ2070744

Shuichi Tsugawa

Publication date: 24 January 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00247-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player
• Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player
• Interactive implementation
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Bayesian Implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation