Bounding the inefficiency of compromise in opinion formation

DOI10.1007/S00453-021-00892-XOpenAlexW3217243208MaRDI QIDQ2072107

Ioannis Caragiannis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris

Publication date: 1 February 2022

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.07309

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumprice of anarchyopinion formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithms in computer science (68Wxx) Graph theory (05Cxx)

Cites Work

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• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks
• Information Retention in Heterogeneous Majority Dynamics
• Reaching a Consensus
• Convergence Speed in Distributed Consensus and Averaging
• Coevolutionary opinion formation games

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