Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01321-WzbMath1482.91038OpenAlexW3094478661MaRDI QIDQ2074038

Adrien Vigier, Jacopo Bizzotto

Publication date: 4 February 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01321-w

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesinformation provisionBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials ⋮ On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ⋮ Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion ⋮ Resisting persuasion

Cites Work

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• Dynamic persuasion
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Experimental design to persuade
• Competition in Persuasion
• When to Drop a Bombshell
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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