Resisting persuasion
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Publication:2074039
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01339-0zbMath1482.91043OpenAlexW4213006599MaRDI QIDQ2074039
Dimitrios Xefteris, Elias Tsakas, Nikolas Tsakas
Publication date: 4 February 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01339-0
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Cites Work
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