Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
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Publication:2074041
DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01386-1zbMath1482.91042OpenAlexW3198303905MaRDI QIDQ2074041
Publication date: 4 February 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01386-1
2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
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Cites Work
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