Competitive disclosure of correlated information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2074043
DOI10.1007/S00199-018-01171-7zbMath1482.91037OpenAlexW2946629642WikidataQ128625894 ScholiaQ128625894MaRDI QIDQ2074043
Publication date: 4 February 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-01171-7
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Related Items (6)
Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy ⋮ Interactive Information Design ⋮ Long information design ⋮ Competitive information disclosure in random search markets ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
Cites Work
- Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
- On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
- Sequential cheap talks
- A Model of Expertise
- Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- Competition in Persuasion
- Strategic Information Transmission
- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
- Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
- Sequential persuasion
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
This page was built for publication: Competitive disclosure of correlated information
