Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
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Publication:2074044
DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01364-7zbMath1482.91061OpenAlexW3157877373MaRDI QIDQ2074044
Zhi-Wei Liu, Nicholas C. Yannelis
Publication date: 4 February 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01364-7
Economics of information (91B44) Individual preferences (91B08) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items
Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion ⋮ Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation
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