Information transmission and voting

DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01191-xzbMath1482.91079OpenAlexW2936789836MaRDI QIDQ2074046

Yingni Guo

Publication date: 4 February 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01191-x

zbMATH Keywords

votingcommittee decision makingverifiable disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Informational correlation and selective disclosure

Cites Work

• How to talk to multiple audiences
• Social choice and strategic decisions. Essay in honor of Jeffrey S. Banks.
• Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
• Deliberative voting
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Strategic Information Transmission