Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver

DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01299-5zbMath1482.91040OpenAlexW2895715802MaRDI QIDQ2074048

Xi Weng, Ju Hu

Publication date: 4 February 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01299-5

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessambiguity aversionprivate informationmaxmin utilityBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (6)

Persuasion with unknown beliefs ⋮ Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models ⋮ Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion ⋮ Resisting persuasion ⋮ Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences ⋮ Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion

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