Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
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Publication:2074049
DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01277-XzbMath1482.91041OpenAlexW3035335331MaRDI QIDQ2074049
Publication date: 4 February 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01277-x
Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Related Items (7)
On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ⋮ Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents ⋮ Optimal stress tests and liquidation cost ⋮ Conveying value via categories ⋮ Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion ⋮ Resisting persuasion ⋮ Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
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