Dynamic coordination via organizational routines

DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01261-5zbMath1483.90062OpenAlexW3039107198MaRDI QIDQ2074051

April Mitchell Franco, Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues

Publication date: 4 February 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96553

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicsorganizationssearchcoordinationteamsroutines

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

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• Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes
• Robust Collusion with Private Information
• Cursed Equilibrium
• A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions

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