Reputation and the ``need for enemies

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01289-7zbMath1482.91120OpenAlexW3036315857MaRDI QIDQ2074052

Patrick Villieu, Maxime Menuet

Publication date: 4 February 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hal.uca.fr/hal-02876593/file/need_11%20%281%29.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

political economytransparencycareer concernsneed for enemies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Deficit, monetization, and economic growth: a case for multiplicity and indeterminacy
• When is reputation bad?
• Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired
• Mixed up? That's good for motivation
• A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
• Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
• Bad Reputation
• Politicians and Firms
• On the efficiency of markets for managers

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