Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
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Publication:2074053
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01324-7zbMath1482.91057OpenAlexW3124122677MaRDI QIDQ2074053
John A. Weymark, Paul H. Edelman
Publication date: 4 February 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01324-7
mechanism designrevenue equivalenceimplementation theoryRochet's theoremdominant strategy incentive compatibility
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The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions ⋮ Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions ⋮ On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms ⋮ Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
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