Prices versus auctions in large markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2074061
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01313-wzbMath1482.91101OpenAlexW3121701536MaRDI QIDQ2074061
Publication date: 4 February 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://econ.msu.edu/repec/wp/191217paper.pdf
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
- Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
- Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
- When and why not to auction
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- An ascending double auction
- Auctions with a buy price
- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Equivalence of auctions and posted prices
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Mid-auction information acquisition
- Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
- Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
- Declining valuations in sequential auctions
- Competing first-price and second-price auctions
- Survival auctions
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets
- How Efficient are Decentralized Auction Platforms?
- The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions
- A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly
This page was built for publication: Prices versus auctions in large markets
