How to choose a fair delegation?
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Publication:2074063
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01312-xzbMath1482.91083OpenAlexW3087900419MaRDI QIDQ2074063
Péter Csóka, Emre Ergin, Burak Can
Publication date: 4 February 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01312-x
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